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This paper explores the structure of cross-border health 
purchasing between Austria and Hungary and determines 
the size of this phenomenon as well as the barriers to a 
further increase. Austrian patients may receive health 
care treatment in Hungary in three different ways. 
First, patients may receive benefits in the context of the 
European Community Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 
(Category I patients). Second, outside those regulatory 
structures, Austrian patients travel to Hungary to receive 
medical treatment, especially dental treatment, and 
then seek reimbursement from their Austrian insurance 
(Category II patients). Third, some patients receive 
medical treatment in Hungary outside both schemes 
(Category III patients). There are about 42,500 Category 
I patients per year; and 58,000 Category II patients 
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world-wide per year. An unknown but supposedly greater 
number of patients travel to Hungary to receive mainly 
dental treatment and cosmetic surgery (Category III). 
Most health actors in both Austria and Hungary do 
not regard cross-border purchasing of health services as 
having cost-saving effects. They put forward major legal, 
institutional, political, and psychological barriers, which 
inhibit public and private Austrian providers, to facilitate 
trade in health care and which inhibit individual patients 
to realize cost savings through capitalizing on lower 
health care prices in Hungary. Therefore, for the time 
being, trade in health care and patient mobility between 
Austria and Hungary is a circumscribed phenomenon in 
terms of quantities, and it will most probably remain so 
in the near future. 
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The widespread vague narrative about cross-border purchasing of health services is as 
follows: Increasing numbers of patients receive planned or urgent medically necessary 
health treatment outside their own country. This outflow of patients happens for various 
reasons. In Austria, one cause is that the cost of less expensive but more frequent health 
services – such as dental care – are not entirely reimbursed by the statutory health care 
system.
1 Rising out-of-pocket expenditures in the past years have been driving patients to 
countries with lower health care prices, such as Hungary.
2 
This paper explores the empirical reality of this narrative with evidence for the country 
pair Austria/Hungary. What legal provisions exist in Austria to import health care from 
Hungary? In turn, what provisions are in place in Hungary to receive Austrian health care 
consumers? What is the quantitative size of this phenomenon? What are the views and 
future plans of the main health care actors in Austria and Hungary on trade in health 
care? Do health care actors facilitate cross-border purchasing of health care, or do they 
obstruct it? If the latter is the case, what are the major obstacles? 
The concepts of “trade in health services” and “cross-border purchasing of health 
services” are used in this paper according to the definition of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS, mode 2).
3 “Trade in health services” is used when referring to 
health organizations contracting health providers abroad in order to deliver health 
services outside their territory. The concept of “cross-border purchasing” is used for 
individual patients who travel abroad to purchase a health service. 
Even though there is a growing body of literature, little is known about the extent and 
shape of the phenomenon of health care purchased in another country. We do not have 
accurate data on how many patients travel to another country to receive health care and 
we know little about the barriers to trade in health services. However, there are singular 
case studies on trade in health services in the United States, Canada or the ASEAN region 
(see e.g. Katz et al. 2002, Mattoo and Rathindran 2006, Arunanondchai and Fink 2007). 
This paper aims at improving our knowledge about the phenomenon of cross-border 
purchasing of health care with the example of Austrians traveling to Hungary to receive 
health care. 
In the first section, the fundamental principles as well as the provisions on the 
importability and exportability of health care of the Austrian and Hungarian health care 
systems will be outlined (1). Second, the European Community provisions on cross-
border health care will be presented (2). In the third section, the differing views of 
Austrian and Hungarian health care stakeholders will be summarized (3). Fourth, the 
available quantitative data on cross-border health care between Austria and Hungary will 
be presented (4). In the fifth section, the potential financial benefits for three health care 
areas will be shown (5). Finally, the case study will discuss the major legal, institutional, 
                                                 
1 On the reduction of mandatory health risk coverage in Bismarckian health insurance systems, see e.g. 
Hassenteufel and Palier (2007: 581–84). 
2 Recent data from Hofmarcher and Rack (2006: 71–72) suggest that the proportion which private 
households (private health insurance, indirect and direct cost-sharing, private non-profit organizations) 
contribute to social health insurance fell from 1995 to 2004. However, direct cost-sharing, defined as co-
payments of private households for benefits covered by social health insurance, rose from 6.5 percent in 
1995 to 7.6 percent in 2004 (as a percentage of total health expenditure). The nominal value of private 
health expenditure rose from 4,210 million Euro in 1995 to 5,339 million Euro in 2004 (ibid: 90). 
3 On the definition of consumption of health services abroad, see e.g. Chanda (2002). 
  2political and psychological barriers which inhibit cross-border purchasing between 
Austria and Hungary (6), before concluding the paper. 
 
 
CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
Austria and Hungary were chosen as a country pair because of various reasons: health 
care standards and prices differ between these countries; they have a long common 
history; and, cross-border contacts are a common phenomenon between the two 
countries. 
The parts on the (legal) national and European structures of receiving health care 
services abroad have been done through a literature survey, a legal analysis, and 
interviews with representatives of ministries of health and social affairs, social security 
institutions, public health care providers, and private health care providers. The third 
section is based exclusively on the information provided in the expert interviews. The 
fourth section presents the available public and unpublished statistics provided by 
Austrian and Hungarian health care institutions. The fifth section relies mainly on an 
analysis of public health care documents as well as explorative information provided in 
telephone and email inquiries. Finally, the sixth section on the barriers to cross-border 
health purchasing is again mainly based on analysis of the expert interviews. 
 
 
1 THE AUSTRIAN AND HUNGARIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS 
 
1.1 Austria 
1.1.1 Fundamental Principles 
In Austria, all employed persons, their family members, and most social assistance 
claimants (thus 98.7 percent of the population in 2007) are covered by statutory health 
insurance (see Federation of Austrian Social Security Institutions 2008b: 25). Persons 
who are not covered have the possibility of voluntary insurance within statutory health 
insurance. In 2001, 112,000 persons were voluntary insured (see Wörister and Rack 
2003: 45). 
In addition to the statutory health insurance, there is the option of private health 
insurance that offers supplementary benefits and betterments. In 1999, approximately 32 
percent of the population had private health insurance (see Loy 2002: 53).
4 The main 
motives for patients to buy private health insurance are threefold. First, it covers the costs 
of better accommodation in hospitals. A second motive is to cover the costs of treatment 
by a non-contracted physician of choice. And third, it shortens the waiting times for 
examinations (see Hofmarcher and Rack 2006: 96). 
Austria’s non-competing self-governing health insurance funds (HIFs) are classified by 
occupational groups (miners, self-employed persons in trade, commerce and industry, 
farmers, railway employees, civil servants, blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, 
etc.), by region, and by employer.
5 There are sub schemes for workers and employees, 
                                                 
4 Hofmarcher and Rack confirm that around a third of the population has private health insurance (2006: 
96). 
5 For a more detailed overview of the structure of the Austrian HIFs, see e.g. Federation of Austrian Social 
Security Institutions (2008a), Hofmarcher and Rack (2006), and Köttl (2008). 
  3civil servants, self-employed in industry and business, and farmers.
6 In 2003, 77.0 
percent of all insured persons were covered by the General Social Security Act, 8.5 
percent by the Civil Servants Health Insurance Act, 6.8 percent by the Social Security 
Act for the Self-employed, and 4.6 percent by the Farmers Health Insurance Act (see 
Hofmarcher and Rack 2006: 73). 
The overall 21 HIFs (nine regional funds, four occupational funds, six company funds, 
as well as the General Work Accident Insurance Institution and the Pension Insurance 
Institution) are united within an umbrella organization, the Federation of Austrian Social 
Security Institutions (Hauptverband der Österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger, 
HVSV). The main tasks of the HVSV are: long-term planning; drawing up guidelines for 
uniform implementation; central data management; contracts with physicians and 
dentists; publication of a list of pharmaceuticals; comparison of key indicators for the 
social insurance institutions; representation of the social insurance institutions in the 
public arena; and acting as a liaison office in the international arena (see Federal Ministry 
for Social Affairs and Consumer Protection 2008: 12). 
In Austria, health care is essentially provided through benefits in kind, either by special 
facilities (above all out-patient clinics) or—to a much larger extent—by institutions under 
special contract (hospitals) or physicians under special contract (in-network facilities and 
physicians). The HVSV and the regional medical associations conclude regional 
agreements. The sub schemes for self-employed, farmers and railway workers have 
contracts on a national level. There are national dental care tariffs for all insured persons. 
If patients receive health services from out-of-network physicians or institutions, they 
have to advance the charged fees and are then partially reimbursed by their insurance 
institution. 
 
1.1.2 Provisions on Cross-border Purchasing of Health Care 
The Austrian statutory health insurance, in contrast to for example Germany, does not 
have suspension regulations any more.
7 This means that the right to health care is not 
suspended while an insured person stays abroad. Consequently, there are no explicit 
domestic provisions which provide for obtaining health care abroad. If health care is 
received abroad, Paragraph 131-1 General Social Security Act (ASVG) which concerns 
the reimbursement of health care treatment costs is taken as a reference point. This 
paragraph states that if an insured person does not make use of the contractual partners 
according to Paragraph 338 ASVG or the facilities of her HIF, she has the right to a 
reimbursement of 80 percent of the amount the health insurance institution would have 
had to pay for a treatment by a physician who has a permanent contract with that 
institution. Paragraph 131-2 provides that the reimbursement of expenses may be 
excluded if the insured has consulted an in-network facility for the same insurance case. 
                                                 
6 See Allgemeines Sozialversicherungsgesetz/ASVG – General Social Security Act, Federal Law Gazette 
1955/189, last amendment I-2003/71; Beamten-Kranken und Unfallversicherungsgesetz/B-KUVG – Civil 
Servants Health Insurance Act, Federal Law Gazette 1967/200, last amendment I-2003/71; Gewerbliches 
Sozialversicherungsgesetz/GSVG – Social Security Act for the Self-employed, Federal Law Gazette 
1978/560, last amendment I-2003/71; Bauern-Sozialversicherungsgesetz/BSVG – Farmers Health 
Insurance Act, Federal Law Gazette 1978/559, last amendment I-2003/71. 
7 In Germany, according to Article 16-1-1 Social Code Book V, benefit claims are suspended as long as an 
insured person stays abroad. 
  4The same provisions exist in the other sub schemes.
8 According to Austrian health care 
law, a foreign physician is thus treated like any other Austrian out-of-network physician. 
The financial cut of 20 percent has been justified with the additional administrative 
burden caused by bills of out-of-network physicians. The individual calculation of the 
billing of out-of-network physicians does increase considerably the administrative 
expenditure in contrast to the computer-based billing of in-network physicians. In 2000, 





1.2.1 Fundamental Principles 
In Hungary, health care coverage is universal and provides access to all out-patient and 
in-patient benefits. The autonomous Hungarian National Health Insurance Fund 
(Országos Egészségbiztosítási Pénztár, NHIF) covers all insured persons. It collects 
contributions at the national level and then allocates the funds to 20 county branches. The 
NHIF contracts freely with providers. Most Hungarian hospitals are public, whereas in 
out-patient care most health care services are provided through in-network private 
providers. Out-of-network physicians are rare and especially concentrated in the dental 
sector.
11 Patients have to make co-payments to certain health services, such as dental 
care, rehabilitation, and stays at health resorts. 
There is a very heterogeneous and expanding private health care sector in Hungary, 
mainly because the state and local governments lack financial resources. The private 
sector ranges from physicians working individually to foreign companies with an 
international network. The majority of private medical care is financed by direct 
payments by the patients. 
 
1.2.2 Provisions on Cross-border Purchasing of Health Care 
Treatment of Austrian patients within the Hungarian NHIF system mainly takes place in 
the context of EC Regulation 1408/71 (see Section 2). In the course of a short temporary 
stay, Austrian insured persons have to carry their European Health Insurance Card with 
them and may receive every medically necessary treatment. The Hungarian physicians 
have to check how long the patient has been in Hungary and in which medical condition 
she is in. As long as the patient cannot go home in order to receive treatment, the 
Hungarian physician has to treat her within the framework of EC Regulation 1408/71. In 
this case, there is no difference in treatment between Austrian and Hungarian patients. If 
a patient travels to Hungary for treatment outside EC Regulation 1408/71, she has to pay 
out-of-pocket for the treatment. Since Hungarian physicians have a lot of leeway for their 
pricing, foreign patients might have to pay a higher price than Hungarians. Most Austrian 
patients travel to Hungary for dental treatment, which is to a very low extent covered by 
the Hungarian and Austrian health care systems. 
 
                                                 
8 See Paragraph 59 B-KUVG, Paragraph 80 BSVG, and Paragraph 96 GSVG. 
9 See Austrian Supreme Constitutional Court, 18 March 2000, G 24/98, V 38/98. 
10 For a more detailed overview of the Hungarian health care system, see e.g. Gaál (2004). 
11 According to information provided by the NHIF, from 4,122 providers in the dental sector, 3,439 have a 
contract with the NHIF. This means that 683 providers in the dental sector do not have a contract with the 
NHIF. 
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2 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PROVISIONS ON CROSS-BORDER 
PURCHASING OF HEALTH CARE
12 
The major part of cross-border purchasing of health care between Austria and Hungary is 
regulated by European Community (EC) regulations, which will be outlined in detail in 
the following section. 
 
2.1 Regulations 1408/71/EEC and 574/72/EEC 
The EC coordination Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 are of great importance for cross-
border medical care.
13 Regulation 883/2004 is going to replace 1408/71. It is not yet 
applicable, though, because it does not have a procedure regulation and several important 
annexes are missing. In the meantime, Article 22-1 of Regulation 1408/71 determines 
that an insured person and her family members staying or residing in another Member 
State are entitled to receive benefits in kind according to the legislation of this Member 
State as if they were insured there, at the expense of their insurance institution. This 
entitlement concerns “benefits in kind which become necessary on medical grounds 
during a stay in the territory of another Member State, taking into account the nature of 
the benefits and the expected length of the stay” (Article 22-1-a). 
For planned treatment abroad, Article 22-2 of Regulation 1408/71 determines that 
authorization for such a treatment 
 
may not be refused where the treatment in question is among the benefits provided for by the legislation of 
the Member State on whose territory the person concerned resided and where he cannot be given such 
treatment within the time normally necessary for obtaining the treatment in question in the Member State of 
residence taking account of his current state of health and the probable course of the disease. 
 
If authorization is granted, the treatment is provided according to the legislation of the 
Member State where the treatment takes place, at the expense of the insurance institution 
in the state of insurance. 
The provisions of Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71 apply to all persons insured under 
the legislation of a Member State and to the members of their families residing with 
them. 
 
The innovative Kohll/Decker jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, based on 
the free movement of services and goods, has abolished the prior authorization procedure 
in the case of out-patient care.
14 Now, patients may consume health care abroad 
                                                 
12 On the problems of implementation and application of the EC provisions, see e.g. Jorens and Hajdú 
(2005). 
13 Detailed information on EC Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72 can be found, for instance, in Cornelissen 
(1996), Schulte and Barwig (1999), or Spiegel (2006). Regulation (EEC) N
o 1408/71 of the Council of 14 
June 1971 applies social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the 
Community, Official Journal L 149, 5 July 1971, pp. 0002–0050. Regulation (EEC) N
o 574/72 of the 
Council of 21 March 1972 fixes the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) N
o 1408/71 on the 
application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the 
Community, Official Journal L 074, 27 March 1972, pp. 0001–0083. 
14 On the Kohll/Decker jurisprudence, see e.g. Hatzopoulos (2002), Jorens (2004), or Sieveking (2007). See 
Case C-158/96, Raymond Kohll vs. Union des Caisses de Maladie [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-120/95, 
Nicolas Decker vs. Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés [1998] ECR I-1831; Case C-368/98, Abdon 
  6independently from prior authorization. They have to advance the payment for the 
treatment and are then reimbursed by their state of insurance according to the current 
reimbursement rates. For in-patient care the prior authorization procedure remains in 
place under the following conditions: 
•  there have to be objective, non-discriminatory criteria for authorization which 
are known in advance; 
•  considered should be what has been sufficiently tried and tested by 
international medical science; 
•  the prior authorization scheme has to be based on a procedural system which 
is easily accessible and capable of ensuring that the request for authorization 
will be dealt with objectively and impartially within a reasonable time; and 
•  there has to be the possibility to challenge a refusal to grant authorization in 
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. 
 
In the following parts, the procedures for the different categories of persons entitled to 
health care benefits abroad within the EC regulatory structure will be examined in more 
detail. 
 
2.1.1 EHIC: Medically Necessary Treatment While Staying Abroad 
If patients are staying temporarily in Hungary, they may use the European Health 
Insurance Card (EHIC) in order to receive all medically necessary treatments (see Article 
22-1 Regulation 1408/71). EHIC has replaced the old E111 Form in 2004 (see European 
Commission 2003). With EHIC all benefits in kind, out-patient as well as in-patient, are 
covered which become medically necessary in the event of a short-term visit in an 
EU/EEA
15 country and Switzerland, taking into consideration the type of treatment and 
the expected duration of the stay. EHIC has to be submitted to the service provider 
abroad (physician or hospital) who then has to check its validity. In individual cases 
physicians do not accept EHIC, but in general it seems that there are no specific problems 
concerning EHIC between Austria and Hungary. In 2005, about 41,000 Austrian EHIC-
cases were registered in Hungary (see Section 4). 
 
2.1.2 E112 Procedure: Authorization for Planned Treatment Abroad 
If patients cannot be treated in Austria in time, they have to be referred abroad under the 
E112 Procedure (see Article 22-2 Regulation 1408/71). This procedure provides for the 
consumption of a specific planned treatment in an EU/EEA Member State and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Vanbraekel and Others vs. Alliance Nationale des Mutualités Chrétiennes [2001] ECR I-5363; Case C-
157/99,  B.S.M. Geraets-Smits vs. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms vs. Stichting CZ 
Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99, V.G. Müller-Fauré vs. Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet vs. Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-56/01, Patricia Inizan vs. 
Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-Seine [2003] ECR I-12403; Case C-08/02, Ludwig 
Leichtle vs. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2004] ECR I-2641; Case C-145/03, Heirs of Annette Keller vs. 
Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social [2005] ECR I-2529; Case C-372/04, The Queen on the 
application of Yvonne Watts vs. 1) Bedford Primary Care Trust 2) Secretary of State for Health [2006] 
ECR I-4325; Case C-466/04, Manuel Acereda Herrera vs. Servicio Cántabro de Salud [2006] ECR I-5341. 
15 The European Economic Area (EEA) was founded in 1994. It comprises the EU Member States and the 
three EFTA Member States: Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
  7Switzerland if the health insurance institution after consultation of the head doctor has 
authorized it. The E112 Form is only displayed in very specific circumstances, if the 
treatment cannot be provided in Austria itself in appropriate time. In the foreign country, 
the E112 Form has to be transferred into a domestic proof of claim.
16 In general, Austria 
is very restrictive in authorizing treatment abroad. The E112 cases concern very 
specialized treatments, which cannot be offered in Austria, e.g. therapy for children with 
dolphins. Up to now, no case has been referred to Hungary. 
 
2.1.3 Pensioners Resident in Another EU Member State 
Pensioners who are insured in Austria but resident in Hungary may receive an E121 Form 
from their insurance institution and submit it to the Hungarian NHIF (see Decision 153). 
The NHIF provides them in the following with an insurance card that entitles them to all 
domestic health care benefits in kind. In 2005, only about 40 pensioners insured in 
Austria but resident in Hungary took up this opportunity (see Section 4). 
 
2.1.4 Regular Cross-border Commuters 
Insured persons who—on a regular basis—cross the border to Hungary may receive an 
E106 Form from their insurance institution and submit it to the NHIF (see Decision 153). 
The NHIF then provides them with a Hungarian insurance card with the right to have the 
same treatment as a Hungarian insured person. In 2005, 1,592 Austrian commuters were 
registered in Hungary to these conditions (see Section 4). 
 
2.1.5 Co-insured Family Members 
Co-insured family members who live in Hungary may receive an E109 Form from their 
insurance institution and submit it to the NHIF who then provides them with a Hungarian 
insurance card with the right to have the same treatment as a Hungarian insured person 
(see Decision 153). In 2005, only about 50 co-insured family members made use of this 
opportunity (see Section 4). 
 
2.1.6 Calculation of Costs 
The costs resulting from the benefits in kind delivered in the framework of EC 
Regulation 1408/71 are calculated between the so-called connecting institutions, on the 
Austrian side the Federation of Social Security Institutions and on the Hungarian side the 
National Health Insurance Fund. Both fulfill only a mailbox function between the 
Hungarian providers and the responsible Austrian HIFs (see Article 36 Regulation 
1408/71). 
The reimbursement mechanism works as follows: A person insured in Austria needs 
medically necessary treatment in Hungary on the occasion of a short term stay. She 
presents her EHIC to the Hungarian service provider and receives benefits in kind. The 
                                                 
16 See Decision N
o 153 of 7 October 1993 of the Administrative Commission on Social Security for 
Migrant Workers on the model forms necessary for the application of Council Regulation N
o (EEC) 
1408/71 and (EEC) N
o 574/72 (E 001, E 103 to E 127) (Text with EEA relevance) (94/604/EC), Official 
Journal L 244, 19 September 1994, pp. 0022–0122. 
The Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers is composed of Member State 
representatives of the ministries for social affairs, employment and health. It has been set up with reference 
to Article 80 of Regulation 1408/71 and is concerned with the correct application of EC Regulations 
1408/71 and 574/72. 
  8Hungarian provider has to check whether the treatment is medically necessary taking into 
account the nature of the benefits and the expected length of the stay (see Article 22-1-a 
Regulation 1408/71). The Hungarian benefit provider then has to fill out Form E125 (see 
Decision 179 of the Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers) 
to assert her claim for reimbursement. The Hungarian NHIF collects these invoices from 
the Hungarian physicians and hospitals and transmits them to the HVSV. The HVSV then 
asks the Austrian HIFs for their acceptance to cover the costs. In case of approval, the 
HVSV transfers the money directly to the Hungarian NHIF that distributes it among the 
Hungarian providers. The Austrian HVSV finally reclaims the money from the HIFs. 
In the case of short stay treatments, E112 Procedures and regular cross-border 
commuters, the actual costs are calculated; for pensioners and co-insured family 
members, lump-sums are paid that have to be determined every year anew in the 
Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant Workers (see Articles 93 to 
95 EC Regulation 574/72). 
According to the Hungarian NHIF, the Austrian Ministry for Social Security and the 
HVSV, there are no specific problems with the above presented reimbursement 
mechanism between the two countries. However, there is a percentage of cases—though 
being low—in which payment is declined for several reasons; for instance the person is 
not an Austrian citizen or the amount has been charged already. The promptness of the 
reimbursement depends on the amount, i.e. for small sums it takes between two to four 
months, for higher sums between six to nine months. 
If a Hungarian health care provider refuses the EHIC of an Austrian patient who then 
has to pay cash in advance—which is sometimes the case—the Austrian insurance 
institutions dispose of an unbureaucratic method of reimbursing claims up to the amount 
of 1,000 Euro. The legal basis for that is Article 34 of EC Regulation 574/72. 
 
 
3 DIFFERING POSITIONS ON CROSS-BORDER HEALTH CARE
17 
This third section will reproduce the views of health care actors in Austria and Hungary 
on cross-border purchasing of health services and trade in health care. 
 
3.1 Austrian Health Actors 
The following parts will shortly summarize the views of Austrian health care actors along 
three issues: What do Austrian health care actors think about cross-border purchasing 
(with a special focus on Hungary)? Do they expect financial cost savings? What do they 
regard as the main problems? 
 
3.1.1 Federal Ministry for Social Affairs 
In general, the Federal Ministry for Social Affairs and Consumer Protection is ambivalent 
regarding cross-border purchasing of health care. On the one hand, it wants to be prudent 
                                                 
17 The following section is based on interviews with representatives of various health care actors in Austria 
and Hungary (ministries for health and social affairs, social security institutions, public health care 
providers, and private health care providers). The author would like to thank all experts contacted during 
the research. Patients or consumer groups were not interviewed because of organizational and financial 
restrictions. 
  9with the opening of borders, because health care is a sensitive issue in Austria. On the 
other hand, it does not want to lag behind European developments. 
According to an official of the Federal Ministry, foreign providers could exert 
considerable pressure on Austrian service providers (dentists and physicians). For 
dentists, the main sources of income are private additional treatments, i.e. jaw 
adjustments, dentures and the like. If patients would migrate in masses abroad, Austrian 
dentists would lose their main source of income. For the moment, however, the Federal 
Ministry does not perceive a major effect of patient mobility. 
From a legal perspective, the Ministry does not see problems for the regional HIFs to 
contract with foreign health care providers.
18 The main question would be which tariffs 
apply. If Austrian HIFs would offer Hungarian dentists the Austrian tariffs, Austrian 
dentists would probably not object. However, this would create tensions in Hungary, with 
a small number of well-off dentists. If the HIFs would offer Hungarian dentists more 
reasonable tariffs—which would be more interesting for the funds—it is very likely that 
Austrian dentists would object to this, regarding it as price dumping. Another important 
question for the Ministry is to secure the quality of treatments in Hungary. However, up 
to today these questions have been treated as a taboo in Austria. 
According to the Federal Ministry, in practice Austrian HIFs do not save money by 
reimbursing patients having had treatment in Hungary. In general, the replacement rates 
for dental treatments are extremely low. The costs (the nominal value) for the HIFs 
remain the same whether a patient pays a treatment in Austria or abroad. If, for example, 
a treatment costs 1,000 Euro in Austria with the HIF paying 100 Euro, and the treatment 
costs 300 Euro in Hungary, the HIF would still reimburse 100 Euro. The saving effect for 
the HIF would therefore be zero. 
According to the Federal Ministry, EC Regulation 1408/71 functions quite well in 
practice, especially in hospitals. There are no specific problems with Hungary, leaving 
the impression that the “new” Member States try to apply EC law correctly. 
 
3.1.2 Viennese HIF 
Currently, trade in health care does not concern the Viennese HIF, neither in positive nor 
in negative terms. However, the Viennese HIF perceives Hungarian providers as a 
potential concurrence for its own health facilities. 
The Viennese HIF does not see cost savings resulting from trade in health care. As far 
as dental treatment is concerned, a representative states, that the HIF always has to pay 
the same amount. In principle, it does not make a difference, whether a patient submits a 
receipt from an out-of-network physician from Vorarlberg, i.e. a Western region of 
Austria, or from Hungary. 
At present, the Viennese HIF has no contracts with foreign providers. There are no 
intentions for the near future to change this status quo, for various reasons: the question 
                                                 
18 One way of dealing with cross-border treatment would be to in-source certain treatments on a contractual 
basis. At the moment there are no contracts between Austrian HIFs and Hungarian health care providers. In 
general, according to the Austrian Ministry for Social Affairs, there are only very few contracts between 
Austrian HIFs and foreign providers in place. There are few efforts to improve this situation. Nevertheless, 
in 2006 the HVSV set up a working group on the issue of cross-border contracts. The reason was that the 
Bavarian Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse—one of the main German insurance funds—wanted to contract 
with Upper Austrian and Salzburg providers. Therefore, the Upper Austrian HIF encouraged the HVSV to 
discuss this matter in principle. 
  10of the applied tariff is not resolved, there are concerns about quality control in Hungary, 
the influence on domestic contracts and tariffs is contested, and issues such as follow-up 
treatments and claims for compensation are not resolved. According to the Viennese HIF, 
cooperation contracts with foreign providers would only cause additional costs, because 
the HIFs currently pay a fixed lump-sum to the regional hospital funds, out of which the 
hospitals are financed. Foreign providers would have to be paid in addition. However, in 
principle it would make sense for the Viennese HIF to have contracts with cheaper 
Hungarian dental laboratories for their own medical facilities. This is a very sensitive 
political issue, though. In theory, the Viennese HIF regards contracts in the hospital 
sector as possible, especially for those treatments which are not available in Austria. The 
HIF would thus be able to exert some influence on pricing within the E112 Procedure. 
However, according to the Viennese HIF, it is difficult to settle such contracts, because 
the Austrian Medical Association has got a say in this as well and is strictly opposed to 
such contracts. 
 
3.1.3 Salzburg HIF 
The Salzburg HIF identifies one major problem with facilitated “health tourism”: the 
difficulty to control the quality of the benefits and its cost effectiveness. 
According to the Salzburg HIF, treatment purchased abroad would not produce cost 
savings, but in the contrary would lead to additional spending. Cost saving effects could 
be achieved only if the reimbursement for foreign providers would be below that of 
domestic contracts and reimbursement tariffs and if the necessary treatment would only 
be claimed abroad. That would be possible in the cases of permanent stays abroad or 
specific treatments. 
 
3.1.4 Medical Association 
In a statement delivered to the author
19, the Austrian Medical Association stands in 
general for mobility and flexibility of physicians and medical services, under the 
condition that the same quality written down in domestic law is being delivered. The 
association states that generally the training of physicians in Hungary fulfills the minimal 
requirements of EEC Directive 93/16.
20 Nevertheless, according to the association, due to 
transitional provisions, some physicians in Hungary do not have diplomas in conformity 
with the directive. 
 
3.1.5 Private Health Insurance Provider 
According to one of the leading private health insurance companies in Austria and 
Europe, it does not discriminate between the usage of health care in Austria and abroad 
with the sole exception of the United States, because of its extraordinary high health care 
costs. Whether a patient submits an invoice from Hungary or from an Austrian region, the 
additional payment of the private insurance is the same. In general, it neither encourages 
patients to purchase health care abroad nor does it discourage them. The private provider 
sees a considerable number of patients traveling abroad, especially in the Eastern parts of 
Austria, concerning dental care. The private provider supports cross-border purchasing in 
                                                 
19 In possession of the author. 
20 This EU Council Directive from April 1993 seeks to facilitate the free movement of physicians and the 
mutual recognition of their diplomas, certificates, and other evidence of formal qualifications in medicine. 
  11general, because it is perceived as being cheaper. The main issue according to the private 
provider is the interplay between public and private social health care insurance. As long 
as there is no harmonization of social security systems in the EU, the private insurer 
cannot offer standardized solutions. Instead, costly single case examinations are 
perceived as disincentive for cross-border purchasing of health care. 
 
3.1.6 Hospital Operator 
According to a big Austrian hospital operator, there is no significant “health tourism” in 
the in-patient sector, except for tourists receiving treatment in the framework of EC 
Regulation 1408/71. Not more than 2 or 3 percent of all its patients are from abroad. The 
hospital operator does not have contracts with foreign insurance institutions, although it 
has received inquiries from the United Kingdom and an international company for 
wealthy Russian patients. The hospital operator would welcome the possibility for such 
contracts for border regions, but there are many problems involved, regarding the tariffs 
and legal uncertainties. According to the operator, an EU-wide harmonization of health 
systems, which is regarded as being very unlikely, should be discussed first. In general, 
the hospital operator thinks that trade in health care is only feasible and reasonable for 
very specific areas, such as specialized surgeries, even in the case of increased inner-EU 
mobility. Trade in health care apart from specialized sectors will be at most a temporary 
phenomenon. The hospital operator thinks that it is much more likely that specialized 
surgeons move instead of patients. Either the surgeons travel to the patient or high 
technology allows them to follow the surgery over a distance. 
According to the hospital operator, domestic and EC law make it near to impossible to 
profit from foreign patients, because they have to be treated like Austrian patients. Prices 
paid for surgeries for the Austrian population, however, are mostly not cost-covering and 
additional tax funds have to be used to cover the incurred “deficits”. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the views of Austrian health care actors on the questions of what 
they think about cross-border purchasing of health care, whether they expect financial 
cost savings, and what they consider the main problems. 
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  What do you think 
about cross-border 
purchasing? 
Do you expect 
financial cost savings? 
What are the main 
problems? 
Federal Ministry for 
Social Affairs  Ambivalent No 
Domestic tensions 








No (in the contrary 
expects additional costs) 
Tariffs; quality control; 
influence on domestic 
contracts and tariffs; 
follow-up treatments; 
claims for compensation 
Salzburg HIF  Only for specific 
treatments 
No (in the contrary 
expects additional costs) 
Quality of the benefits; 
cost effectiveness 
Medical Association  Only if same quality is 
being delivered  -  Conformity with 
Austrian standards 
Private health insurance 
provider 
In principle cheaper but 
structures are missing 
Not under the current 
conditions 
Interplay between 
public and private 




would be welcome; 
only in specific areas; 




uncertainties; lack of 
EU harmonization 
 
3.2 Hungarian Health Actors 
The following paragraphs will shortly summarize the views of Hungarian health care 
actors along two issues: What size does the phenomenon of cross-border purchasing 
have, and is it growing? Are foreign patients perceived to be a good business 
opportunity? 
 
3.2.1 National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) 
According to the Hungarian NHIF, 99 percent of Austrian patients who receive dental 
treatment in Hungary do it via the out-of-network way, as private patients. There are 
endeavors—though not yet very concrete—to increase cross-border cooperation in health 
care with Slovakia, i.e. cooperation between Northern Hungary and Southern Slovakia. 
There are few efforts to encourage trade in health care (e.g. spa treatment), but those 
benefits do not fall under the EC regulations or are not financed by the NHIF. For spa 
treatment, more German than Austrian patients travel to Hungary. 
 
3.2.2 Association of Human Private Health Care Providers 
According to the Hungarian Association of Human Private Health Care Providers, the 
main obstacles to cross-border purchasing are on the one hand the immobility of patients 
and on the other hand the lack of public financing. The association assumes that the 
public sector would be in principle interested in cross-border care, because the health 
sector in Hungary is structurally underfunded. Therefore, patients from abroad could 
generate additional resources. However, the Hungarian NHIF cannot calculate a higher 
  13invoice for foreigners, due to EC anti-discrimination regulations. Therefore, the public 
sector lacks an incentive to trade health care. 
For the private sector the problem is, according to the association, of a different nature. 
Most big private health care companies are concentrated in the Budapest area and are not 
near the border, which creates a disincentive for Austrian patients.
21 Budapest locates 
some specialized hospitals which provide primarily out-patient care and whose clientele 
is mainly Hungarian. However, a major percentage also comes from abroad. Due to cost 
and marketing considerations, these specialized hospitals offer only very few profiles on 
a very high level, e.g. eye treatment or rheumatology (see e.g. the clinic “Focus Medical 
Margitsziget”). According to the association, the private providers view foreign patients 
in principle as a good business opportunity, however primarily for marketing 
considerations. 
The biggest problem identified in Austria itself is the widespread belief that the quality 
of Hungarian health care is lower. Therefore, patients do not want to travel to Hungary. 
 
3.2.3 Buda Health Center 
According to the director of the Buda Health Center, a private clinic in Budapest with 
140 beds and about 12,000 patients in 2005, the number and share of its foreign patients 
have been growing over the years. In 2005, the share of foreign patients in out-patient 
treatment was about 20 percent: about five percent were patients from outside Hungary; 
and about 15 percent were foreigners living in Hungary. The share of foreign patients of 
the overall business for the Buda Health Center was about 30 percent. 
The patients of the Buda Health Center have to pay in cash. The clinic has contracts 
with the Hungarian NHIF (a very limited volume, 3,700 DRG
22 points, with a waiting 
list) as well as with Croatian and Slovak insurance companies. The clinic does not price-
discriminate between foreign and Hungarian patients concerning the medical treatment. 
Nevertheless, foreign patients receive a different service level. They are offered more 
comfortable single rooms, better food, and private nurses in their native language. 
Therefore, foreign patients on average have to pay more. The clinic perceives foreign 
patients as a good business opportunity. The facility for spinal disorders, that belongs to 
the Buda Health Center, is even dependent on foreign patients, because of the overall low 
number of potential patients. The clinic therefore tries to attract patients on the occasion 
of conferences of medical societies and through foreign doctors who know the expertise 
of the Buda Health Center. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the views of Hungarian health care actors on the questions of 
whether cross-border purchasing has been growing, and whether foreign patients are 
perceived as a good business opportunity. 
 
                                                 
21 The majority of Austrian patients who travel to Hungary go to the border region (Sopron, Györ, 
Mosonmagyaróvárn, and Szombathely). 
22 Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) designate a system of classification for groups of in-patient care. 
  14Table 2: Views of Hungarian Health Actors 
 
  Has cross-border purchasing 
been growing in the last years? 
Do you perceive foreign patients 
as a good business opportunity? 
NHIF Moderate  No (at least not for the public 
sector) 
Association of Human Private 
Health Care Providers  Moderate  Yes (though primarily for 
marketing considerations) 
Buda Health Center 
Number and share of foreign 





4 QUANTITATIVE DATA ON CROSS-BORDER PURCHASING OF HEALTH 
CARE 
There are few reliable data available on cross-border purchasing of health care between 
Austria and Hungary. The regional Austrian HIFs and the HVSV did not provide 
statistics that differentiate between the countries to which insured persons travel in order 
to receive health care treatment. The Hungarian NHIF, however, was able to deliver some 
differentiating data. 
The gathered data do not provide a satisfying picture of the phenomenon of cross-
border purchasing of health services. The number of Austrian patients seeking health care 
in Hungary within the EC regulatory structure is about 42,500. The number of Austrian 
patients seeking health care abroad world-wide and then claiming (partial) reimbursement 
from Austrian social insurance—estimated by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Social 
Affairs—revolves around 58,000 per year. An unknown number of patients travel to 
Hungary to receive mainly dental treatment and cosmetic surgery outside these 
established structures. Overall, it can be said that the number of Austrian patients treated 
in Hungary is quite modest.
23 
 
4.1 Data for Austria 
According to reports of the Administrative Commission on Social Security for Migrant 
Workers, in 1997, Austria spent 0.48 Euro per inhabitant on medical benefits consumed 
in other countries on average. A year later, this value rose to 1.87 Euro and amounted to 
8.90 Euro in 2004.
24 
According to rather old data from the Austrian Ministry for Social Affairs presented in 
Table 3 (1997–1998), very few patients, i.e. an estimated 850, travel each year to another 
country under the E112 Procedure (see Section 2.1.2), for the average costs of 5,523 
Euro. The E112 authorization procedure is mainly used for hospital treatment. 
 
                                                 
23 Albreht, Pribaković and Štalc (2006) find the same for Austrians traveling to Slovenia to receive health 
care. 
24 However, according to a representative of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Social Affairs, these data are 
highly questionable. 







% of persons in 
relation to total 
number of insured 
persons 
% of the general costs of 
Austrian health 






850 4,700,000.00  0.0154  0.04  5,523.00 
Source: The author assembled these figures from an internal report of the Austrian Ministry for Social 
Affairs and a report of the Association Internationale de la Mutualité. The figures represent only estimates. 
 
In 1997/1998 about 58,000 people traveled abroad and sought (partial) reimbursement for 
mainly non-hospital treatment, for the average costs of only 58 Euro (see Table 4). There 
is no reason to believe that these figures have changed substantially since then. It can be 
assumed that a large percentage of the reported cases concerned patients that purchased 
dental treatment in Hungary. From the 4,715 cases reported by the Lower Austrian HIF, 
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Austria  (total)  58,030 3,445,470.00 1.0517  0.03  58.00 
Source: The author assembled these figures from an internal report of the Austrian Ministry for Social 
Affairs and a report of the Association Internationale de la Mutualité. The figures represent only estimates. 
 
The figures presented above do not include cases in which people purchased health care 
abroad without being reimbursed. The number of these not reported cases is according to 
many sources much higher than the reported cases. In a report in 2005, the renowned 
consumer protection journal Konsument speculated about 160,000 Austrians traveling to 
Hungary for dental treatment every year.
26 In a small exploratory study in 2006, Österle 
                                                 
25 These people supposedly went to the former Central European and Eastern European Countries. 
26 The findings of the journal Konsument, however, are based on anecdotal reports by patients, dentists, 
dental technicians, and dental companies. In addition, the findings are inconclusive. On the one hand, there 
is much praise primarily coming from the patients. They appreciated friendliness, language skills, time 
dedicated to patients, and prices. On the other hand, there was also much criticism, especially—yet not 
surprisingly—by Austrian dentists. They criticized that the time dedicated to the patients was too short, 90 
percent of the edges of crowns would not fit the standard, 80 to 90 percent of the patients would have gum 
problems, and oral hygiene would not be a subject. 
  16and Delgado found that about 80 percent of their respondents paid their dental treatment 
in Hungary out-of-pocket, while only 20 percent were partially reimbursed (2006: 134). 
These numbers suggest that the majority of cross-border cases take place outside the EC 
regulatory framework and Austrian reimbursement provisions. However, the exact 
number of this category of patients remains unknown. 
 
UNIQA, a private insurance company, provided data on in-patient treatment of Austrian 
patients abroad (see Table 5). In 2003, UNIQA reimbursed 692 persons, world-wide, for 
the total amount of 2,349,754 Euro. In 2005, the numbers were still rather low and 
increased only modestly (937 persons; 2,985,412 Euro). 
 
Table 5: UNIQA: In-patient Treatment Abroad, 2003–2005 
 
 2003  2004  2005 
Switzerland 60  81  75 
Germany  271 266 293 
Europe  229 201 305 
Rest of the world  132  155  264 
Total  692 703 937 
Amount in Euro  2,349,754  2,033,337  2,985,412 
Source: Data provided by courtesy of UNIQA, assembled by the author. 
 
4.2 Data for Hungary 
Within the regulatory structures of the EC, about 42,500 Austrian insured persons 
received Hungarian health treatment in 2005 for the total amount of 732,558 Euro (see 
Tables 6 and 7). These numbers cover several different groups: Austrian pensioners 
resident in Hungary, regular cross-border commuters, co-insured family members, and 
persons who stayed in Hungary only for a short term (see Table 6). The majority of cases 
concerned medical aid and visits paid to a general practitioner. Half of the overall costs 
were caused by expensive benefits in kind (see Table 7). 
 
Table 6: Treatment in the Framework of EC Regulation 1408/71, 2005 
 
Group of persons  Form  Number of 
cases  Type of calculation  Granted benefits 
Pensioners (insured in 
Austria, resident in 
Hungary) 
E121 40  Lump-sum All  benefits 
Regular cross-border 
commuters  E106 
1,592 (registered 
in Hungary, plus 
co-insured) 
Actual costs  All benefits 
Co-insured family members  E109  50 (registered in 
Hungary)  Lump-sum All  benefits 




Source: Data provided by courtesy of the Hungarian NHIF, assembled by the author. 
  17Table 7: Treatment in the Framework of EC Regulation 1408/71 (Medically 
Necessary Treatment Abroad and Regular Cross-Border Commuters), 2005 
 
Case  Number of cases  Euro  Euro/case 
CT (computer tomography)/ MRI (magnetic 
resonance imaging)  197 16,051.2  81.47 
Disposable instruments  3  1,626.3  542.10 
Expensive benefits in kind  489  366,275  749.02 
In-patient treatment  2,237  14,979.8  6.69 
Dental treatment  156  6,183.01  39.63 
Spa treatment  606  219,887  362.84 
Medical Aid  23,453  17,052.7  0.72 
Pharmaceuticals 196 385.378  1.96 
Treatment at general practitioner  15,170  89,888.3  5.92 
Care at home  3  229.791  76597 
Total 42,510  732,558  17.23 
Source: Data provided by courtesy of the Hungarian NHIF, assembled by the author. 
 
Outside the structures provided by the EC Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72, 3,510 
Austrians purchased health care in Hungary for the total amount of 262,370 Euro in 2005 
(see Table 8). This number provides only an account of the reported cases from the in-
network physicians and hospitals to the NHIF. Out-of-network actors do not have to 
report their cases, the overall number therefore being unknown. 
 
Table 8: Treatment Outside the Framework of EC Regulation 1408/71, 2005 
 
Treatment  Number of 
cases 
Value in Euro (not actual price, 
according to NHIF provisions)  Euro/case 
In-patient 705  249,240  353.53 
Out-patient 2,805  13,130.9  4.68 
Total 3,510  262,370  74.74 
Source: Data provided by courtesy of the Hungarian NHIF, assembled by the author. The 
hospital/physician determines the price in advance. Only in-network hospitals/physicians have the duty to 
report to the NHIF. 
 
 
5 POTENTIAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS FROM CROSS-BORDER 
PURCHASING FOR SELECTED HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
The above presented data show that cross-border purchasing of health care is at the 
moment a minor phenomenon regarding health services covered by the statutory Austrian 
health insurance system. This section will look at the potential benefits for Austrian 
insurance institutions and individual patients regarding health services which are not 
always fully covered: cataract surgeries, dental treatment, and cosmetic surgeries. 
In principle, the statutory health insurance in Austria covers all treatments that are 
medically indicated; only few areas are not covered such as specific cosmetic surgeries or 
fixed dentures. Each regional or occupational HIF has its own catalogue of benefits that 
are covered by it. The HIFs fund the public hospitals with lump sums without giving a 
limit regarding the treatments covered. Each hospital then decides independently whether 
  18the treatment is medically indicated or not. Therefore, it cannot be determined in general 
whether a specific treatment is covered or not. 
 
5.1 Cataract Surgeries 
According to the Yearbook of Health Statistics of Statistics Austria, all public and private 
hospitals conducted 60,699 in-patient cataract surgeries in 2005 (see Statistics Austria 
2007).
27 
There is a difference regarding prices for cataract surgeries between the Austrian LKF-
point system
28 and the specialized Hungarian private clinic “Focus Medical 
Margitsziget” (see Table 9). Whereas a cataract surgery costs between 1,608 to 2,059 
Euro in Austria, it costs between 960 to 1,500 in the Hungarian clinic. If a private patient 
purchases a cataract surgery on her own in Hungary instead of receiving it in Austria, the 
potential benefit would range between 559
29 and 648
30  Euro . 
 










 Euro  Euro  Euro 
Cataract surgery  1,608–2059
31
    960–1500 648/559
32
Source: These data have been taken from the homepage of the Hungarian Private Clinic “Focus Medical 
Margitsziget” and the Austrian LKF-system, March 2007. 
 
The above calculation has been made on the basis of the Austrian LKF-points, which 
require several remarks: The LKF-points are only an approximate value. They are 
composed of a benefit component (in the case of cataract 509 to 551 points) and a daily 
component (831 to 1165). The LKF-system has its roots in the 1980s and follows 
basically the DRG-system of the United States. The calculation for a benefit provided in 
an Austrian hospital is complex and consists of three stages. First, LKF-points are 
calculated nationally for each and every group of treatments. Second, every region 
determines a value that corresponds to one LKF-point. And third, every region 
determines a hospital factor for university or standard hospitals. These three components 
then determine how much a hospital receives for a certain benefit. 
                                                 
27 In 2005, there were 264 in-patient hospitals in Austria officially registered under the Federal Hospital 
Act, with a total of 63,248 available beds. Independent out-patient health care centers numbered about 
1,000 (see Federal Ministry of Health and Women 2007a: 17) 
28 In 1997, Austria introduced the performance-oriented hospital financing system (Leistungsorientierte 
Krankenanstaltenfinanzierung, LKF) based on modified diagnosis-related groups (Austrian DRG System) 
(for a more detailed discussion see e.g. Hofmarcher and Rack 2006: 178–181). 
29 Comparing the highest price. 
30 Comparing the lowest price. 
31 1340–1716 LKF-points: the benefit component is 509 (551); the daily component is 831 (1165); and the 
mean value of duration of stay is 2.9 (3.4). The LKF-points have been multiplied by 1.2 Euro. 
32 The lowest and the highest prices have been compared. 
  19The Austrian LKF-system was calculated in 1999 and does not reflect any more the 
costs of the hospitals in 2007. Therefore, the Austrian Health Institute (ÖBIG)—in 
cooperation with the Ministry for Health and “SOLVE Consulting”—is at the moment 
(re-) calculating the reference points. According to “SOLVE Consulting”, one LKF-point 
equals about 1.2 Euro today. In every region, the financing of the LKF-points is 
organized differently. For instance, whereas in Lower Austria one LKF-point equals 
about one Euro, in Upper Austria it equals around 55 Cents. There, the so-called 
Abgangsfinanzierung, i.e. tax money, covers the “deficit” of the hospitals. In the Austrian 
region of Tyrol the equivalent of one LKF-point is about one Euro. One of the reasons for 
this almost cost-covering approach in Tyrol is that there are many foreign tourists who 
are treated there. 
These brief remarks on the LKF-system, which is in place in Austria, show that the 
price comparison between Austrian and private Hungarian hospitals can only be 
approximate, because the financing of Austrian hospitals usually is not cost-covering. 
 
5.2 Dental Treatment 
There are no statistical data on the market size of dental treatments in Austria and 
Hungary. Regarding the prices for dental treatment there is a big variation within and 
between Austria and Hungary. The Konsument in a rather anecdotal report in 2005 
provided examples for prices: the average costs for simple crowns were 140 to 250 Euro 
in Hungary, whereas in Austria costs were between 378 and 713. The average costs for 
fillings in Hungary were 30 to 60 Euro, in Austria between 20 and 380. 
There is some evidence that in the last years the price levels for dental treatment have 
been converging, i.e. they decreased in Austria and increased in Hungary. This effect is 
partly attributed to the pressure coming from Hungarian providers. Therefore, a partial 
relocation of “dental tourism” toward cheaper countries such as Romania has already 
taken place and will become even more pronounced in the future. 
The available data (see Table 10) show that there is still a price incentive for Austrian 
patients to travel to Hungary for dental treatment. This is especially true for fixed 
dentures and crowns, because the Austrian health insurance institutions do not cover 
these treatments; less so for removable dentures because they pay half of the costs. 
According to Österle and Delgado, regarding fixed dentures the price differential between 
Austria and Hungary is still considerable; regarding preserving treatments it is much 
lower (2006: 151). 
  20Table 10: Prices for Dental Treatment in Comparison 
 
 Austria  Hungary 
Treatment 
According 























  Euro Euro Euro  Euro Euro  Euro 
Crown 
(metal)  378–713 140–250  -  149–169  255 
Crown 
(porcelain)  378–713  140–250  200–300 360 420 
Fixed 





- -  298–400  560 
Removable 






-  400 plus 50 per 
tooth (metal)  298–400 230 
Note: These data have been taken from a report of the Austrian consumer protection journal Konsument, 
the homepages of the Dental Clinic “Perfect Profiles” in Budapest, the Dental Clinic “Laserdent” in 
Sopron, the “Rosengarten” Dental Group in Sopron, and the Viennese HIF, March 2007. 
 
5.3 Cosmetic Surgeries 
There are no reliable data on the number of cosmetic surgeries per year in Austria and 
Hungary. The clinics that were interrogated in the framework of this research did not 
want to (in the Austrian case) or were not able to (in the Hungarian case) disclose 
statistics about the number of surgeries per year. 
The potential benefit for Austrian patients for receiving a cosmetic surgery in Hungary 
is difficult to calculate, because prices in the Hungarian clinic interrogated in this 
research depend on the clinical needs of patients, the number of days in the hospital, and 
the quality of the hotel. 
If prices without accommodation are compared, the potential benefit oscillates between 
710 and 1,710 Euro for various kinds of cosmetic surgeries (see Table 11). However, it 
has to be noted that travel costs to Budapest are not included in this calculation. 
                                                 
33 The Viennese HIF and individual dentists did not disclose price information on crowns and fixed 
dentures via telephone. They referred to the necessity of seeing the patient first. 
34 The first figure signifies the amount that the insured person has to pay for the benefit. The figure in 
brackets provides the overall costs. The Viennese HIF covers half of the costs. 





Clinic in Budapest 
Austria 
“EMCO” Private 




(including only an 




(all inclusive without 
stationary stay) 
Approximate value in 
Euro 
Face/Necklift  About 3,290
35
  4,000 (5,080
36) About  710 
Rhinoplasty About  2,490  3,800–4,700 (4,880–
5,780
37)  About 1,310 
Mammoplasty 
(augmentation)  About 2,490  4,200 (4,920
38) About  1,710 
Mammoplasty (reduction)  About 2,990  4,700 (5,420–5,780
39) About  1,710 
Blepharoplasty (eyelid)  About 1,190  2,100 (2,820
40) About  910 
Blepharoplasty (undereye)  About 1,290–1,490  2,300 (3,020
41) About  810–1,010 
Abdominoplasty About  3,290  4,700  (5,780–6,140
42) About  1,410 
Source: These figures have been taken from the homepages of the private Hungarian Clinic “Perfect 
Profiles” and the Austrian private clinic “EMCO” in Salzburg and verified by telephone, March 2007. 
 
 
6 BARRIERS TO CROSS-BORDER PURCHASING OF HEALTH CARE
43 
Section 5 has shown that there are indeed, though modest, price differentials in selected 
health care sectors and resulting from that there are potential cost savings for Austrian 
HIFs and individual patients. However, for the time being, the number of persons 
traveling abroad to receive treatment is rather low. The reluctance of insurance funds and 
patients to purchase health care abroad can be explained with multiple barriers to trade in 
health services. This section will deal with the main factors that inhibit Austrian public 
and private health insurers as well as individual patients from realizing cost savings 
through capitalizing on lower health care prices in Hungary. 
 
                                                 
35 The prices for the Hungarian clinic only refer to the actual price for the individual treatment. Anaesthesia 
costs about 330 Euro, sedation about 160 Euro, according to the needs. Accommodation etc. is not 
included. 
36 The clinical lump sum for a day in the private clinic “EMCO” amounts to 360 Euro. For face/necklift 
three days in the hospital have to be counted. 
37 A stay of three days is necessary. 
38 A stay of two days is necessary. The implants, which are not included in the price, cost between 500 and 
600 Euro. 
39 A stay between two to three days is necessary. 
40 A stay of two days is necessary. 
41 A stay of two days is necessary. 
42 A stay between three to four days is necessary. 
43 For a more detailed discussion on the obstacles for trade in health care, see e.g. Brouwer et al. (2003), or 
Vollaard (2005). 
  226.1 Barriers Inhibiting Public Austrian Providers 
Public Austrian health care providers face legal, institutional and political barriers which 
inhibit them to facilitate cross-border purchasing of health care. 
 
6.1.1 Legal Barriers 
According to a representative of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Social Affairs, the 
Austrian system does not differentiate between visiting a private physician in Austria or 
abroad. However, the fact that foreign physicians do not have contracts with Austrian 
insurance institutions constitutes an indirect health trade barrier. To remedy this 
disadvantage, contracts between regional Austrian HIFs and foreign providers would be 
needed, which determine regulations on the applied tariff, on legal issues such as claims 
to damages, etc. However, at the moment such contracts are nonexistent. 
From a legal perspective, Austrian hospitals are not allowed to have direct contracts 
with the regional insurance funds. The HIFs pay an agreed amount of money into the 
regionally organized hospital financing funds
44, out of which the hospitals receive their 
revenue. In contrast to these provisions, in Germany, contracts between hospitals and 
insurance funds are the rule. To harmonize the health care systems would be, therefore, a 
precondition for cross-border contracts. 
 
6.1.2 Institutional Barriers 
There are also “constraints” coming from European Community rules: Regulations 
1408/71 and 574/72 are a well-established structure to ensure that citizens receive health 
care whenever they cross borders (see Section 2). The well-established EC regulatory 
structure impedes Hungarian providers to attract Austrian patients, since they have to be 
treated like Hungarian patients in order to guarantee non-discrimination. 
An additional institutional barrier is the expected negative effect of increased out-
sourcing of health care on the health care facilities which are owned by Austrian HIFs. 
The case of the Viennese HIF facilities is most obvious, because of the proximity to 
Hungary. 
Also, the out-sourcing of health care constitutes an additional financial burden for the 
regional HIFs. They have to pay a fixed amount into the hospital financing fund. If they 
out-source health care, they would have to face additional costs. 
If specific treatments would be out-sourced to other countries, e.g. to Hungary, the 
Austrian hospitals would still be obliged to provide the full range of services. The 
Austrian health care system could realize cost savings only if entire parts of hospitals 
were to be closed down. 
In general, Austrian hospitals do not receive a cost-covering remuneration for their 
services. Therefore, in all regions there are so-called Abgangsdeckungssysteme in place, 
i.e. systems which cover the “deficits” resulting from the financing shortfall. For 
                                                 
44 In 1997, all Austrian regions set up proper funds which operate since then the financing of their public 
hospitals. For example, in Upper Austria the “Gesundheitsfonds – Geschäftsstelle für intramurale 
Aufgaben” administers about 1.4 billion Euro, with which the 20 hospitals within the fund, i.e. regional 
hospitals, religious order hospitals and Community hospitals, are financed through LKF-tariffs and 
subsidies for investment. The federal State, the Länder, the local authorities and social insurance 
institutions provide these resources. The 20 hospitals within the fund receive a certain amount of points for 
every treatment (about 1000 treatments). The catalogue for all benefits can be found in Federal Ministry for 
Health and Women (2007b). 
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hospital financing fund. The remaining 40 percent are compensated through so-called 
Abgangsdeckungsmittel, i.e. tax money to compensate for the non cost-covering 
remuneration of the hospitals. In principle, the tax money could also be transferred 
directly to the hospital financing funds, but the political will to do so is presently 
nonexistent. One reason for the reluctance to provide the hospital funds with adequate 
resources is that political actors lack an interest in a more transparent health system. A 
second reason is that the Länder and local authorities can strongly influence the health 
care system by financing it. They do not want to give away this political leverage. 
 
6.1.3 Political Barriers 
The Austrian Medical Association is fiercely opposed to the out-sourcing of health care 
with the aim to protect its clientele from unwelcome concurrence from foreign providers. 
The General Social Security Act (see Paras 338 and 339) determines that the association 
has a considerable say regarding contracts and a right to statement if the provision of 
services is changed. Therefore, public health insurance institutions shy away from a 
conflict with the Medical Association on the issue of cross-border purchasing of health 
care. 
On a more general level, all relevant health care actors refuse to extend the private 
sector: the regional health insurance funds, the Federation of Austrian Social Security 
Institutions, the federal State, the Länder, and the local authorities. In Austria, there 
seems to be a “political consensus that a market-based provision of health care services is 
incompatible with the aims of the welfare state” (Hofmarcher and Rack 2006: 195). An 
out-sourcing of health care to foreign (private) providers would foil this consensus. 
 
6.2 Barriers Inhibiting Private Austrian Providers 
The barriers inhibiting potential trade in health care are quite similar for both public and 
private providers. However, there are also specific legal, psychological and institutional 
barriers which prevent private providers to engage in trade in health services. 
 
6.2.1 Legal and Psychological Barriers 
Private Austrian health insurers may only offer a supplement to the statutory health 
insurance. They consider themselves as the “cherry on the cake”.
45 Their raison d’être 
consists of providing more choice than the statutory insurance. As a result, they have no 
interest in restricting the access to health care for their insured or steer them toward 
specific countries without losing this reputation. 
 
6.2.2 Institutional Barriers 
At the moment, the private insurers have to develop expensive individual schemes for 
cross-border cases. The fact that national social security schemes are not harmonized on 
the EU level prevents standardized schemes: If a person who is insured in Austria moves 
to another country and changes her status, i.e. becomes insured in another country, 
private insurers have to check case by case whether their insurance coverage is still 
suitable. 
                                                 
45 This expression was used by a representative of a private insurance company in an interview for this 
study. 
  24 
6.3 Barriers Inhibiting Individual Patients 
There are also various barriers for individual patients to take up the opportunities of 
cross-border purchasing of health care. They may have the (subjective) fear that they do 
not receive adequate quality of health care in Hungary, which prevents them from 
purchasing health care abroad. Also, claims to damages regarding Hungarian providers 
are difficult to enforce in case of a qualitatively bad treatment. There are further barriers, 
such as geographical distance, language issues, etc., which inhibit increased mobility of 




Cross-border purchasing of health services between Austria and Hungary takes place 
either within the well-established institutional framework of the European Community, 
and the domestic Austrian and Hungarian provisions, or—to a supposedly greater 
extent—outside these structures. EC Regulation 1408/71 provides a framework in which 
patients from Austria can be treated in Hungary at the expense of their insurance 
institution: the E112 Procedure, the EHIC procedure, provisions for commuters, 
pensioners, and co-insured family members all facilitate the utilization of health care in 
Hungary. The Austrian reimbursement provisions, which are applied outside the EC 
regulatory structures, do not differentiate between domestic and foreign out-of-network 
physicians. Therefore, health care received abroad is being reimbursed to the same 
amount as health care received by an out-of-network Austrian physician. These 
provisions—exceptional in the EC—have incited a considerable number of patients to go 
abroad, also to Hungary, to receive cheaper (in particular dental) treatment. Estimations 
assume that a higher but currently unknown number of patients travel to Hungary outside 
these established EC and domestic structures and pay their treatment out-of-pocket 
without receiving reimbursement. 
However, for the time being, the available data indicate that trade in health care 
between Austria and Hungary is a circumscribed phenomenon in terms of quantities, and 
it will most probably remain so in the near future. In contrast to countries such as the UK 
or the US, in Austria there are fewer incentives for patients to purchase health care 
abroad: most treatments are provided by the statutory health care system and there are 
virtually no waiting lists (on this issue see e.g. Hofmarcher and Rack 2006: 86). 
This paper has shown that most health care actors in both Austria and Hungary are 
skeptical or altogether reluctant toward increased trade in health services. However, this 
issue attracts more and more academic and political attention at all levels. At the 
domestic level, there are considerations within the Austrian administration to discuss the 
issue of contracts with foreign health care providers. For the time being, however, there 
are no improvements. At the EC level, patient mobility has become an issue too.
46 The 
so-called High Level Process of Reflection on Patient Mobility and Healthcare 
                                                 
46 See for instance the following projects all funded by the European Commission: 
HealthBasket project (http://www.ehma.org/projects/default.asp?NCID=112); 
HealthAccess project (http://www.ehma.org/projects/default.asp?NCID=113); 
and Europe for Patients project (http://www.iese.edu/en/events/Projects/Health/home/home.asp). 
  25Developments entailed also talks about EU certified centers of reference.
47 These at the 
moment rather vague ideas could lead one day to specialized hospitals of reference in 
which patients from all over Europe are sent to receive health care treatment. 
                                                 
47 In June 2002, an EU Health Council started a “High Level Process of Reflection on Patient Mobility and 
Healthcare Developments in the European Union”, in which Health Ministers of the Member States and the 
European Parliament together with representatives of patients, professionals, providers and purchasers of 
health care discussed matters of health care, including the reconciliation of national health policy with EU 
obligations. The general results of this process of reflection were issued by the European Commission 
(2004). 
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